IT之家5月22日消息 今日，比爾蓋茨（Bill Gates）通過(guò)比爾·蓋茨官方公眾號(hào)分享了它的2020夏季書(shū)單，推薦了一本由阿比吉特·班納吉（美）與埃斯特·迪弗洛（法）所著名為《好的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)》的書(shū)。
IT之家了解到，比爾蓋茨認(rèn)為，《好的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)》是《你當(dāng)像鳥(niǎo)兒飛向你的山》《鄉(xiāng)下人的悲歌》及《掃地出門(mén)》等書(shū)的有益補(bǔ)充，這些書(shū)生動(dòng)描繪了在美國(guó)出身貧寒是一種怎樣的體驗(yàn)。班納吉與迪弗洛使用大量數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)洞悉全局，讓我們得以通過(guò)更廣闊的視角觀(guān)察這些人的動(dòng)因。
以下為比爾蓋茨書(shū)評(píng)全文：
Did you know that there’s no such thing as the Nobel Prize for Economics? The economics award that most people refer as the Nobel is an add-on, the product of a 1968 gift from a big bank celebrating its 300th anniversary. That’s why the name of the award is the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel.
你知道其實(shí)并沒(méi)有所謂的“諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)”嗎？多數(shù)人所說(shuō)的“諾貝爾”經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)是另加上去的，由一家大銀行為慶祝其成立300周年于1968年捐贈(zèng)設(shè)立。這就是為什么該獎(jiǎng)項(xiàng)的名稱(chēng)其實(shí)是“瑞典國(guó)家銀行紀(jì)念阿爾弗雷德·諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)”。
The economics prize differs from the official Nobel Prizes in another way: It honors a social science rather than a natural science. Economics is not grounded in natural laws like Newton’s law of gravitation. It’s rooted in human nature, which is notoriously hard to predict.
該經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)有別于官方的諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)之處還在于：它用以表彰社會(huì)科學(xué)而非自然科學(xué)。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)并不像牛頓萬(wàn)有引力定律那樣以自然法則為基礎(chǔ)。它根植于人性，而人性的難以預(yù)測(cè)眾所周知。
I think about this every time I hear about a new book on economics and consider adding it to my bookbag. I have no trouble finding books by smart economists. But I do sometimes worry that those economists won’t have appropriate humility about what economic methods can and cannot teach us.
每當(dāng)聽(tīng)到一本經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的新書(shū)并考慮將其收入囊中時(shí)，我都會(huì)想到這一點(diǎn)。找到聰明經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的著作對(duì)我來(lái)說(shuō)并不難。但我有時(shí)確實(shí)會(huì)擔(dān)心，這些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家不會(huì)對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)方法能做什么和不能做什么保留適當(dāng)?shù)闹t虛。
Two economists who are honest about the limits of economics and don’t oversimplify are the husband-and-wife team of Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo. They’re the couple who started MIT’s Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL). I have always admired their rigorous, experimental approach to assessing the merits of different approaches to fighting poverty, and I loved their first book, Poor Economics (2011). Therefore, I was pleased when I learned they were going to publish a second book, Good Economics for Tough Times. Two weeks before the book hit the bookshelves, they won the 2019 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, along with their colleague Michael Kremer.
由阿比吉特·班納吉和埃斯特·迪弗洛兩位經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家組成的夫妻檔，對(duì)于經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的局限性既坦誠(chéng)，又不過(guò)分簡(jiǎn)單化。他們二人在麻省理工學(xué)院共同創(chuàng)建了“貧困行動(dòng)實(shí)驗(yàn)室”（J-PAL）。我一直很欣賞他們以嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)、實(shí)驗(yàn)性的方法來(lái)評(píng)估不同扶貧方式的優(yōu)點(diǎn)，我也喜歡他們的第一本書(shū)《貧窮的本質(zhì)》（ 2011年出版）。因此，當(dāng)?shù)弥麄円霭娴诙緯?shū)《好的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)》時(shí)，我很開(kāi)心。在這本書(shū)上架前兩周，他們與同事邁克爾·克雷默一同獲得了2019年瑞典國(guó)家銀行紀(jì)念阿爾弗雷德·諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)。
Just like the couple’s first book, their new one is easily accessible for readers who don’t have a degree in economics. And they acknowledge at the very beginning, “We, the economists, are often too wrapped up in our models and our methods and sometimes forget where science ends and ideology begins.”
就像這對(duì)夫婦的第一本書(shū)一樣，他們的新書(shū)對(duì)于沒(méi)學(xué)過(guò)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的讀者而言同樣簡(jiǎn)明易懂。他們?cè)谝婚_(kāi)始就表示：“我們這些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家，常常過(guò)度專(zhuān)注于自己的模型和方法，有時(shí)會(huì)忘記哪里是科學(xué)的盡頭和意識(shí)形態(tài)的開(kāi)啟。”
In one important respect, the new book is a significant departure from their previous one. Poor Economics, as its name suggests, focused on poor countries. Good Economics for Tough Times focuses instead on the policy debates that are getting so much attention in wealthy countries. (Obviously, since it was written long before the coronavirus pandemic, it doesn’t touch on that issue.) Although it’s clear that their real expertise is microeconomics (the study of how individual people make decisions) rather than macroeconomics (the study of how an overall economy behaves), Banerjee and Duflo are good at assembling and explaining the facts behind contentious issues like immigration, inequality, and trade.
在一個(gè)重要的方面，這本新書(shū)跟前一本截然不同。《貧窮的本質(zhì)》，顧名思義聚焦在貧窮國(guó)家。與之相反，《好的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)》關(guān)注的是富裕國(guó)家中備受關(guān)注的政策辯論（很顯然，由于此書(shū)完成于新冠疫情暴發(fā)之前，故未涉及此問(wèn)題）。盡管兩位作者真正的專(zhuān)業(yè)領(lǐng)域是微觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（研究個(gè)人如何做選擇）而不是宏觀(guān)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)（研究整個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體如何表現(xiàn)），班納吉與迪弗洛善于整合和解釋爭(zhēng)議事件背后的事實(shí)，例如移民、不平等和貿(mào)易等。
I’ll give you an example from their discussion of immigration. It turns out that the field of economics has more clarity than I realized about the effect of immigration on jobs.
我會(huì)給你一個(gè)他們探討移民問(wèn)題的例子。原來(lái)從經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)解讀移民對(duì)就業(yè)的影響，可以比我想象中的要清楚許多。
You have probably heard the argument that when immigrants who are willing to work for low pay show up in a community, they almost inevitably—based on the rules of supply and demand—trigger the reduction of wages for some percentage of the local population. But Good Economics for Tough Times shows how that concern is misplaced. “There’s no credible evidence that even relatively large inflows of low-skilled migrants hurt the local population,” Banerjee and Duflo write. “This has a lot to do with the peculiar nature of the labor market. Very little about it fits the standard story about supply and demand.”
你可能聽(tīng)過(guò)這樣一種論點(diǎn)：基于供需關(guān)系原則，一個(gè)社區(qū)中愿意低薪工作的移民會(huì)不可避免地導(dǎo)致一定比例的當(dāng)?shù)鼐用袷杖氲南鳒p。然而，《好的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)》展示了這種擔(dān)憂(yōu)是如何錯(cuò)誤地產(chǎn)生的?！安](méi)有可靠的證據(jù)表明，低技術(shù)移民的大量涌入會(huì)對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)鼐用裨斐蓚Α！卑嗉{吉與迪弗洛在書(shū)中寫(xiě)道，“這與勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)的特性有很大關(guān)系。在勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)上，幾乎很少有符合標(biāo)準(zhǔn)供需關(guān)系的情況。”
Why doesn’t the labor market fit the standard story? Banerjee and Duflo show that migrants are not just workers; they’re also consumers. “The newcomers spend money: they go to restaurants, they get haircuts, they go shopping. This creates jobs, and mostly jobs for other low-skilled people.” Another reason is that an influx of new laborers reduces companies’ incentive to automate their operations. “The promise of a reliable supply of low-wage workers makes it less attractive to adopt labor-saving technologies.”
為什么勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)不符合標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的供需關(guān)系？班納吉與迪弗洛指出，移民不僅是勞動(dòng)者，而且是消費(fèi)者?！斑@些新移民會(huì)消費(fèi)：他們?nèi)ゲ宛^、去理發(fā)、去購(gòu)物。消費(fèi)會(huì)創(chuàng)造新的就業(yè)，并且其中絕大部分是提供給其他低技術(shù)人群的?！绷硪粋€(gè)原因在于，新勞工的涌入降低了企業(yè)實(shí)現(xiàn)自動(dòng)化的積極性?！坝辛说托焦と说目煽抗?yīng)保證，采用減少勞動(dòng)力的技術(shù)手段便少了吸引力?！?/p>
In contrast with immigration, economists do not have clear data or conclusions when it comes to what drives economic growth. As I noted in my reviews of Robert Gordon’s great book The Rise and Fall of American Growth and Vaclav Smil’s masterpiece Growth, I have a lot of optimism about the ways artificial intelligence and other digital tools will accelerate learning, productivity, and innovation. But that said, Banerjee and Duflo make a powerful case that it’s just about impossible to make specific predictions in this area. “Of all the things economists have tried (and mostly failed) to predict, growth is one area where we have been particularly pathetic.”
與移民問(wèn)題形成鮮明對(duì)比的是，在談及推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的因素時(shí)，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們并沒(méi)有明確的數(shù)據(jù)或結(jié)論。正如我之前在關(guān)于羅伯特·戈登的精彩著作《美國(guó)增長(zhǎng)的起落》以及瓦科拉夫·斯米爾的杰作《增長(zhǎng)》（Growth，中文名暫譯）的評(píng)論中所提到，我非常樂(lè)觀(guān)地相信人工智能及其它數(shù)字工具，將加快學(xué)習(xí)、生產(chǎn)力與創(chuàng)新。話(huà)雖如此，班納吉與迪弗洛提出了有力的觀(guān)點(diǎn)，認(rèn)為在這一領(lǐng)域做出具體的預(yù)測(cè)幾乎是不可能的。“在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們?cè)噲D預(yù)測(cè)（又多以失敗告終）的所有事情中，對(duì)于增長(zhǎng)的預(yù)測(cè)尤其令人失望?！?/p>
Some economists argue that there’s at least one sure-fire way to boost an economy: cutting taxes. But Banerjee and Duflo show that even the iconic version of these cuts, the major tax reform enacted under Ronald Reagan, did little if anything to accelerate growth. “There is no evidence the Reagan tax cuts, or the Clinton top marginal rate increase, or the Bush tax cuts did anything to change the long-run growth rate,” Banerjee and Duflo write.
一些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，至少有一種萬(wàn)無(wú)一失的方法來(lái)刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)：減稅。但是班納吉與迪弗洛表示，即使是減稅政策的標(biāo)桿——羅納德·里根任期內(nèi)頒布的重大稅制改革——也幾乎沒(méi)有起到刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的作用?！皼](méi)有證據(jù)表明，里根的減稅政策、克林頓的最高邊際稅率提高政策和布什的減稅政策，對(duì)于經(jīng)濟(jì)的長(zhǎng)期增長(zhǎng)率有任何改變。”班納吉與迪弗洛寫(xiě)道。
But don’t high taxes on wealthy people like me reduce our incentive to work hard and create new jobs? The answer is no. Banerjee and Duflo found no evidence that people at the top of the income distribution change their behavior in ways that affect the overall rate of economic growth. “In a policy world that has mostly abandoned reason … let’s be clear: Tax cuts for the wealthy do not produce economic growth.” Banerjee and Duflo have given me even more reason to advocate, as I did in a recent post, for a tax system in which, if you have more money, you pay a higher percentage in taxes and the rich pay more than we currently do.
但是，對(duì)像我一樣的富人征收高額稅負(fù)，是否會(huì)削弱我們努力工作的積極性和創(chuàng)造新工作崗位的動(dòng)力？答案是否定的。班納吉與迪弗洛沒(méi)有發(fā)現(xiàn)任何證據(jù)可以表明，處于收入分配頂端這部分人的行為改變會(huì)影響整體的經(jīng)濟(jì)增速?！霸谝粋€(gè)幾乎放棄講道理的政策世界中……讓我們直說(shuō)吧：為富人減稅并不會(huì)帶來(lái)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)?！卑嗉{吉與迪弗洛讓我有了更多理由去倡導(dǎo)這樣一種稅收制度（就像我在近期一篇文章中寫(xiě)的那樣）：你越有錢(qián)，你的稅率就應(yīng)該越高；富人要比現(xiàn)在繳更多的稅。
Banerjee and Duflo also offer good insights on what’s causing the economic despair in rural and Rust Belt America (before COVID). They offer a stinging critique of the financial sector and its behavior, but they find that the biggest driver of despair is the sorting that results from the expansion of global trade. “Those lucky enough to be in the right place at the right time, with the right skills or the right ideas, grew wealthy, sometimes fabulously so,” they write. “For the rest … jobs were lost and not replaced…. Trade has created a more volatile world where jobs suddenly vanish only to turn up a thousand miles away.”
班納吉與迪弗洛還就（新冠疫情暴發(fā)之前）造成美國(guó)農(nóng)村及鐵銹地帶經(jīng)濟(jì)絕望的原因提出了很好的見(jiàn)解。他們對(duì)金融業(yè)及其行為提出了尖銳的批評(píng)，但他們發(fā)現(xiàn)導(dǎo)致絕望的最大動(dòng)因是全球貿(mào)易擴(kuò)張產(chǎn)生的排序?！澳切┳銐蛐疫\(yùn)的人在正確的時(shí)間、正確的地點(diǎn)具有正確的技能或正確的想法。他們獲得了財(cái)富，有時(shí)甚至是驚人的財(cái)富。”他們寫(xiě)道，“對(duì)于其余的人來(lái)說(shuō)……丟了工作又找不到其他機(jī)會(huì)……貿(mào)易創(chuàng)造了一個(gè)更加動(dòng)蕩的世界，就業(yè)崗位突然在這里消失，卻在千里之外的地方出現(xiàn)?！?/p>
I’m in favor of trade, though I think Banerjee and Duflo overemphasize the role it plays in job losses and underemphasize the big role played by technological advances. But they are right that political leaders could be more honest that there are winners and losers from trade and from new technologies—and then enact smart policies to help. Sadly, “the United States [did] not come close to compensating workers who lost out,” they write.
我是支持貿(mào)易的，雖然我認(rèn)為班納吉與迪弗洛過(guò)分強(qiáng)調(diào)了貿(mào)易對(duì)于工作機(jī)會(huì)流失的作用，而低估了技術(shù)進(jìn)步所起到的作用。但他們有一點(diǎn)是對(duì)的，那就是政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人可以更加誠(chéng)實(shí)地承認(rèn)，貿(mào)易和新技術(shù)既產(chǎn)生了贏(yíng)家又產(chǎn)生了輸家，接著他們就可以推出明智的政策來(lái)提供幫助?？杀氖牵懊绹?guó)沒(méi)有補(bǔ)償這些失業(yè)工人”，他們?nèi)绱藢?xiě)道。
In the end, Good Economics for Tough Times felt to me like a good complement to books that paint intimate portraits of what it’s like to grow up poor in America, including Educated, Hillbilly Elegy, and Evicted. Banerjee and Duflo use extensive data to zoom out and show us a wider view of these human dynamics. Their research is not hard science, like chemistry or physics. But I found most of it to be useful and compelling. I suspect you would too.
最后，在我看來(lái)，《好的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)》是《你當(dāng)像鳥(niǎo)兒飛向你的山》、《鄉(xiāng)下人的悲歌》及《掃地出門(mén)》等書(shū)的有益補(bǔ)充，這些書(shū)生動(dòng)描繪了在美國(guó)出身貧寒是一種怎樣的體驗(yàn)。班納吉與迪弗洛使用大量數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)洞悉全局，讓我們得以通過(guò)更廣闊的視角觀(guān)察這些人的動(dòng)因。他們的研究不是像化學(xué)或物理這樣的硬科學(xué)，但我發(fā)現(xiàn)其中大部分既有用又有說(shuō)服力。我想你也會(huì)有同感。
廣告聲明：文內(nèi)含有的對(duì)外跳轉(zhuǎn)鏈接（包括不限于超鏈接、二維碼、口令等形式），用于傳遞更多信息，節(jié)省甄選時(shí)間，結(jié)果僅供參考，IT之家所有文章均包含本聲明。